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Abstract
For many applications, a distributed system is an attractive alternative to a single system
because it supports global applications accessing multiple systems, and thus enhances perfor-
mance. The rapid growth of advanced applications involving distributed transaction processing
has resulted in the development of various distributed systems, models and transaction lan-
guages. In this paper, we present the InterBase system, its Parallel language (IPL), and its
Interbase Logic Controller (ILC). IPL is a transaction-oriented language that allows users to
write global transactions by specifying all associated actions and their sequences, as well as
logical dependencies and data flows among subtransadions. ItC is used to control the different
tasks to be performed within the Interbase environment, all without violating the autonomies of
the local systems and respecting their heterogeneities. ILC guarantees two levels of consistency,
consistency among transaction dependencies and consistency among security policies.
Keywords. Distributed database, Knowledge Database, Multilevel Security, Interdependent data,
Flex transaction.
1 Introduction
The rapid growth of advanced applications involving distributed transaction processing has resulted
in the development of many distributed models and languages. Early distributed systems were pro-
grammed in conventional sequential languages, were centralized, and support limited transactions.
The traditional programming languages have serious limitations and constraints in the representa-
tion and the execution of distributed applications. With today's development of sophisticated and
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complex distributed applications, the extended traditional sequential languages cannot adequately
support the development of these advanced applications. Moreover, properties such as isolation
and consistency have to be relaxed in the new distributed system in order to satisfy other needs
like autonomy and heterogeneity.
One of the consequences of the information explosion taking place in society is the emerging
need to access heterogeneous and isolated repositories. Due to the isolation property, it is more
difficult for programmers to write global applications which make full use of the data and resources
at their disposal since the systems that they need to use are not integrated.
The transaction model defined within the Interbase ( a multidatabase system project at Purdue
UNiversity) environment, the Flex model, provides for additional capabilities not originally forseen
in traditional transactions. These new capabilities are required in order to describe applications in
multidatabase systems. Among these capabilities, we mention:
Functional replication. Alternative ways by which a specific task can be performed are conve-
niently stated in the in the Flex model.
Control Isolation. The Flex transaction model allows transactions to include some transactions
that are compensatable.
Dependency. The model allows for specifying functions and relations that can be used to
influence the execution of a transaction.
The Interbase Parallel Language fully supports a distributed programming environment. It
supports a high degree of parallelism and provides synchronization and high-level communication
among sub transactions within a global transaction.
Transaction management in multidatabase systems has been the subject of extensive research.
Many problems remain unresolved because of the complexity caused by data distribution, hetero·
geneity, the need to preserve the autonomy of the member database systems, and the security
policies of each local database system.
Interdependent data are data related to each other through integrity constraints. Interde-
pendency has been found to occur naturally in organizations, and 1s costly to maintain (see, for
example, [3D. Examples of interdependent data include replicated data, partially replicated data,
and summary data. Various classifications and issues related to 1nterdependent data management
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have been done, based on several criteria such as type of interdatabase dependency, degree of local
autonomy, and data consistency criteria.
A multilevel secure database system is a system that protects data classified at more than one
security class and allow sharing between users with different clearance levels. Permission to access
data is determined not only by the accessibility of the user requesting access to the data, but
also by the security level of the data. The clearance level of the user classification can be applied
at different levels of granularity in the database, for example, at the relation, tuple, attribute, or
element level [1]. The interdependence of data and potential difference between the security policies
adopted by the system members make it difficult to achieve a secure system.
In th.is paper, we describe the role oflogic to perform two tasks: controlling dependency between
subtransactions and resolving security inconsistencies within interdependent data. These two tasks
are performed through the components of the InterBase system. The InterBase Parallel Language
(IPL), supports a powerful description of advanced transactions, provides communication among
the subtransactions within a global transaction, and allows for properties such as compensatability
and function replication. The Distributed Interbase Transaction manager interprets and coordinates
the execution of global transactions. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: A description
of advanced features of the transactions and a presentation of the Interbase Parallel Language is
provided in section 2. Section 3 presents the The multilevel security of interbase and discusses the
inconsistency of security constraints. Section 4 outlines the structure of a Knowledge Database,
and describes the interbase system. The concluding remarks and an agenda for future work appear
in Section 5.
2 InterBase Parallel Language
IPL supports distributed applications. It allows the parallel execution of Flex transactions. We
present in this section transactions dependencies, the definition of Flex transaction, the structure
of IPL programs, and the notion of acceptable sets.
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2.1 Transactions Dependencies
An object in a databa.se ha.s a type, a state, and a set of operations that provide the means to create,
modify and retrieve the state of the object. The state of an object is represented by its content.
A global transaction accesses and manipulates the objects in a local databa.se by submltting a
sub transaction that invokes operations specific to the objects. The effect of an operation invoked
by a subtransaction on an object is made permanent if the subtransaction is comrnited; it is deleted
if the subtransaction is aborted.
Dependency relations provide a convenient way to describe the behavior of subtransaetions and
can be expressed in terms of subtransaction states. The state of a subtransaction is time dependent
and ha.s six values: waiting state, executing state, success state, failure state, committed state, and
aborted state. Different types of dependency can occur, among them we mention [6], [7]:
Success Dependency. Transaction t is success dependent (t <SD e) if t can be executed only
after t' is successfully executed
Failure Dependency. Transaction t is failure dependent(t <FD t ' ) if t can be executed only
after t' is executed and failed
Commit Dependency. Transaction t is commit dependent on t' (t <CD t') if t and t' commit
then the commitment of e precedes the commitment of t.
Abort Dependency. Transaction t is abort dependent on t' (t <AD e) if when t ' aborts, then
t aborts
Exclusion dependency. Transactions t and t' are exclusive dependent (t ED e) if both t and
t' cannot commlt.
The above dependencies are cla.ssified behavioral dependencies. Such dependencies describe
relationships among (sub)transactions ba.sed on their behavior (Le. the different states of the
subtransactions). Two other categories can be established, structural dependencies and external
dependencies.
A structural dependency describe the hierarchy among the subtransactions of a global transac-
tion. In general this hierarchy is a tree-like structure with the global transaction as the root. While
traditional transactions are represented by a one level tree, Flex transactions are represented by a
two level tree, and a nested transaction has no height limitation.
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An external dependency associates the different states of a (sub)transaction to external param-
eters such as time, cost values, etc.. Function passing between substransactions can be considered
a behavioral dependency.
Illustrative Example 1. Consider a travel agent (TA) information system [8]; a transaction t
in this system may consist of the following tasks:
Cl: TA negotiates with airlines for flight tickets, and get a ticket if the price. is less than $300.
C2: TA negotiates with car rental companies for car reservations, and reserve a car if Hight ticket
is purchased.
C3: TA negotiates with hotels to reserve rooms.
Let us assume that the refinment of these subtransactions leads to the following subtransactions:
tl: Order a ticket at Northwest Airlines;
t2: Order a ticket at United Airlines;
t 3 : Rent a car at Hertz
t4 : Rent a car at Avis;
t s: Reserve a room at Sheraton;
t6: Reserve a room at Ramada.
t
I, ts
Figure 1. TA Transaction
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The different dependencies are described by:
<sn and <Fn : tj <sn tk tj <FD t1 for j=3,4 i=3,4 and k=5,6
ExtD: cost(ti) < $300, for i=l,2.
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2.2 Flex Transactions
The Flex transaction model is designed to provide more flexibility in transaction processing. It
allows the description of transaction that is composed of a set of task. Each task is achieved through
a set of functionally equivalent subtransactions. The execution of a Flex transaction succeeds if
all its tasks are accomplished. A Flex transaction is resilient to failures in the sense that it may
proceed and commit even if some of its subtransactions fail. The Flex transaction model allows
the specification of dependencies on the subtransactions. The most useful dependencies in the Flex
transaction model are failure-dependencies, success-dependencies and external dependencies.
In order to capture the notion of the compensability of subtransactiolls, we use the concept
of typej a subtransaction is said to be of type C if it is cornpensatablej it is of type NC if it is
Don-compensatable. Call T the set of sub transactions of a transaction denoted by t. and t is
called a Flex transaction if there is a 3-tuple (DEP, ExD, Acc) such that: DEP is a set of internal
dependencies defined on Tj ExD is a set of external dependencies defined on the elements of Tj and
Acc is a boolean function, called the acceptable function, which defines the different combinations
of subtransaction states that are acceptable to commit transaction t.
We illustrate the definition of Flex transaction by using the example of the travel agent trans-
action introduced in Figure 1. In that case, we have T = {t,c"c2,ca,tl,t2,ta,t..t.tsltS}j DEP is
composed by the two dependencies <SD and <FD defined above; Ext is reduced to one relation
defined by Cost(td < $300, for i=1,2j and Acc is the function that gives the value "acceptable" to
the sets {tl , tal ts) and {h, ta, ts}.
In the sequel we represent an acceptability function by the enumeration of all the sets to which
it associates the value "acceptable".
2.3 Structure of IPL programs
An IPL program describes a Flex transaction. It contains four fundamental components: objects
and types, subtransactioll definitions, dependency descriptions among subtransactions, and accept-
able function.
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Objects and types. Objects in IPL serve as results of and arguments to sub transactions in the
context of a global transaction. Therefore, in IPL each sub transaction is associated with a type.
Types have unique names and are used to categorize objects into sets capable of participating in a
specific set of subtransactions.
Definition of Subtransactions. A subtransaction is a task executable by a local software system
in a distributed system. The subtransaction may require the results of other subtransactions
as its input. It may also be executed under particular time constraints or other conditions. A
subtransaction is provided with an identifying name which should be unique within the context of
a global transaction.
Dependency Description. Dependency description provides users with a mechanism for spec-
ifying the explicit dependencies among the sub transactions of a global transaction. That is, the
execution order of the sub transactions or a global transaction can be defined with the use of the IPL
dependency description. Correct parallel execution and synchronization among the subtransactions
of a global transaction can thus be specified through the dependency description. For example,
given six sub transactions t l , t2, t3, t4, ts, and t6, their execution order, and IPL dependency
description are defined by:
1. t2 will be executed only if tl succeeds.
2. t3 will be executed only if tl fails.
3. t4 and ts will be executed only if t2 or t3 succeeds.
4. t6 will be executed only if t3 and t4 succeed or ts fails.
5. the global transaction will succeed if at least two of t4, ts, and t6 succeed.
Acceptable sets. The fourth component of IPL begins with the keyword acceptable_sets and
ends with the keyword endaccs. The acceptable sets provide function replication which can tolerate
the failure of individual subtransactions by exploiting the fact that a given function can frequently
be accomplished by more than one software system. For example, the transaction programmer may
leave to the system the choice of renting a car from Hertz or Avis.
An acceptable set consists of a subtransaction list and a sufficient acceptable condition of
the global transaction. When a global transaction reaches its final status, the user is asked to
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select a preferred acceptable set from an array of alternatives. All the subtransactions in an
acceptable set in the array must be successful. Successful non-compensatable subtransactions are
maintained in an uncommitted state until the global transaction is completed. When the user
chooses an acceptable set and the global transaction commits, the uncommitted subtransactions in
the acceptable set then perform their commit operations, all other uncommitted subtransactions
perform their abort operations, and the compensatable subtransactions not in the acceptable set
perform their compensating operations. When the global transaction decides to abort, all the
successful subtransactions perform their abort or compensating operations.
Acceptable sets support function replication within global transactions, and thus enable them
to tolerate the failure of individual sub transactions by exploiting the ability of several software
systems to accomplish a given function. For the example presented in section 2.1, the acceptable
sets could be:
acceptable...sets
{tt, t2, t'll ts}, {tt, t2, t'l. ts}, {t3' t'l, ts, ts}, {t3, t4, t s}, {t3' t4, ts}
endaccs
In this example, five acceptable sets are included; they are sub transaction sets itt, t2. t.1l ts}.
{tt. t2• t4, t6}, ita, t.1l ts , t6}, ita, t4, ts}, and ita. t4• ts}.
The success of any of these five subtransaction sets will result in the success of the global
transaction, and thus provide function replication within the global transaction.
2.4 The InterBase Logic Controller
In this section we describe the ILC component for IPL. The function of this component is to insure
the consistency of transactions dependencies and to build acceptable sets for transaction.
Dependencies. The different dependencies are not disjoint and may have some overlaping seman-
tics. The Interbase approach to resolve the potential inconsistencies between these dependencies is
to establish a knowledge base that reports on the different dependencies stored. Among the rules
stored, we mention:
Transitive Rule «SD is an example of such transitive rule)
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Ii R is transitive and t R t' & t' R to!, Then t R t"
Symmetric Rule (ED is an example of such transitive rule)
liR is symmetric and t R t', Then t' R t
Overlapping Rule
If R includes R' and t R t', Then t R t'
Disjoint Rule «SD and <SD represent an example of such rule)
If R is disjoint from R' and t R t', Then not(t R' t')
These rules complete the definition of the different dependencies that a user can utilize and
check for the inconsistency between them.
Acceptable Sets. With IPL programmmg the user is allowed to express the acceptable sets.
However these acceptable sets should he consistent with the success dependency and failure depen-
dency relations. Theoretically the acceptability function is deduced from these relations using a
set of rules among whlch we mention the following:
TerminaLAcc rule
liS acceptable set and {t It <SD x} =0 and {t It <FD x} =0, Then xES
Success_depend rule
If S acceptable set and xE Sand y<SD x , Then yE S
Failure_depend rule
If S acceptable set and xE Sand X<SD y, Then yE S
The list of rules in that paper is not exhaustive. Other dependencies may have effect on the
determination of the acceptable sets. Applying these rules to the TA transaction example, we can
see that, for the TA transaction, only 8 acceptable sets can be defined:
it;, tj, td, for i=1,2, j=3,4, k=5,6
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3 On the Security of InterBase
A multilevel database system is a database system that protects data classified at more than one
security class and allow sharing between users with different clearance levels of the user. Permission
to access a data is determined by not only the accessibility of the user requesting access to the data,
but also the security level of the data. The clearance level of the user classification can be applied
at different levels of granularity in the database, for example, at the relation, tuple, attribute, or
element level [1]. Security level of each data may be assigned explicitly, by attaching a label of
security to the data, or implicitly, by defining a set of security constraints. An effective security
policies for a multilevel distributed database system should ensure that users only acquire the
information to which they are authorized. The Bell-LaPadula security model [2] is used as such a
security policy.
Security Constraints are the rules which assign classification levels to data. They consist of
data specification and a classification. The data specification defines any subset of the database;
the classification defines the secUIity level of each element of this subset. We address two types of
classifications:
1. Simple classifications: They assign security levels by tuple and by element as they are
stored in the database.
2. Context classifications: They assign security levels to the result of applying functions on
an attribute or subset of attributes, or change the security levels of the data upon changing
factors such as time.
We consider the set SEC of all security constraints. An element of SEC is a pair (spec, class),
composed of data specification "spec" and the classification "class" of this data. Since a set of
global security constraints must be based on consistent local security constraints, OUI system must
detect and resolve all inconsistent security constraints. Among the specifications inconsistencies
specifications, we find:
1. Conflicting Security Constraints. Conflicting security constraints aTe those constraints
that classify the same fact into different classifications.
2. Included Security Constraints. Included security constraints are those constraints that
are enforced to the relations or attributes that are the same or structurally equivalent.
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3. Disjointed Security Constraints. Disjointed security constraints are those constraints
that are enforced to some related but not the same relations or attributes.
4. Dominated authority levels. A classification C of data specification A dominates C' if C
is higher than C'.
A longer list of inconsistencies can be established. Based on this list, we define a rule base that
describes how to correct the incriminated inconsistencies. We discuss in the following the rules that
solve the four inconsistencies mentioned above.
Illustrative Example 2. Consider an HDDBS consisting of two LDBSs, D1 and D2 • Let R1
and R2 be two relations at D1 and D2, respectively:
R1(ProjNo, ProjName, Budget) and R2 (P-No, P-Name, P-Researchers)
We consider the followjng security cons taints enforced on R1 and R2, respectively:
C1: The project name is confidential (at D1)i
C2: The project name is secret (at D2);
C3 : The project name is top-secret (at D j ) if its budget is greater than 1 million dollar;
C4: The project name is top-secret (at D2 ) if it involves more than ten researchers;
Cs: The project name is top-secret (at D2 ) if its bndget is greater than 2 million dollar;
Then C1 and C2 conflict, C3 and C4 are disjointed, and C3 includes Cs.
The ILC component for Security Inconsistency. The function of this component is to locate
and resolve inconsistencies between security constraints. The approach is based on the use of a
database rule. In the following, we present some of these rules. Let S be the set of ssurne security
constraints, and assume that (A,C) and (A',C') are in S.
Conflicting_Security Rule
If A and A' are interdependent and C:pC' , Then
Included_Security Rule
If A and A' are included (or overlapped), Then change (A"C') to (A,C')
Dominated_authority Rule
Ifjf A=A' and C~C', Then remove (A',C') and change C to include C'
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4 The InterBase System
In this section, we present the ILC, and briefly describe the InterBase System, and then discuss the
key components of the Distributed InterBase Transaction Manager. The correct interaction among
concurrent global transaction and recovery issues are also discussed.
4.1 The Interbase Knowledge Base
The Interbase Knowledge has three components: 1) A rule base that describes the relationship
between the dependencies available for the user. 2) A rule base that contains rules to check the
reachability of acceptable sets and the automated generation of all acceptable sets. 3) A rule base
that controls the consistency of security constraints. AU the rules represented in the Interbase
Knowledge base are production rule-like, and the system works in forward reasoning.
While the rule base for acceptable sets is limited in size, the rule base for security has no
limitation, because of the interdependence between data. Nevertheless, The complexity of the rules
represented in ILC dependes on the nature of interdependency of the data.
4.2 Architecture of InterBase System
We will describe the various components and modules of the system and briefly explain their mutual
interactions. The InterBase System is designed to allow users to write global applications over a
distributed, autonomous, and heterogeneous computing environment (in particular, a multidatabase
environment), while retaining the autonomy of Local Software Systems (LS8s).
The major components and modules of the InterBase System and the relationships among them
are presented in Figure 2. At present, the InterBase System runs on an interconnected network
with a variety of hosts that include Sun, HP and NeXT workstations, Sequent machines, IBM
mainframes, and IBM/PCs.
The Distributed InterBase Transaction Manager (DITM) is at the center of the InterBase Sys-
tem. DITM interprets and coordinates the execution of global transactions, which are in IPL
format, over the entire system.
RSls ensure a uniform interface to DITM and deal with the heterogeneity of the LSSs, thus
relieving DITM from dealing with each LSS directly.
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An IPL text from either source is executed by DITM as a global transaction over the InterBase
System. Assisting in this process is the Decentralized Concurrency Controller (DCC), consisting
of a Group Manager (GrMn) and Subtransa.ction Schedulers, each of which is a portion of an RS!.
DCC is so named because it is based on decentralized algorithms discussed in [4]. DCC is used to










Figure 2. The Interbase System
The major advantage oftrus architecture is its decentralization feature. The DITM is distributed
on all the machines from which IPL programs are executed; that is, each global transaction is
associated with an image of DITM. Only the Group Manager of DCC must be run on specific
machines. To increase system reliability. the Group Manager consists of a primary and a backup
group manager. Upon receiving a starting request from a global transaction, the Primary Group
Manager decides the transaction group for the transaction, according to a graph algorithm described
in [5]; The Subtransaction Schedulers of the DCC in the individual RSIs guarantee that transactions
are executed in quasi serialization order on each L8S. The RSI executes the subtransactions sent
to it, in the order specified by the group manager.
The information exchanged within the Interbase System is performed via computer network,
and therefore each component of the InterBase System has location transparency.
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Each component of InterBase maintains a write-ahead log to keep track of its execution; thus
whenever a component of InterBase fails, InterBase can always recover the component to its state
right before failure. The Primary Group Manager also monitors the execution of each component
of InterBase, such as RSIs and the Backup Group Manager, and recovers the failed ones. The
Backup Group Manager monitors the execution of the Primary Group Manager. If the Primary
Group Manager fails, the Backup Group Manager sends broadcast messages to all images of DITM
and takes over the control of the Primary Group Manager. At the same time, a new Backup Group
Manager starts. This feature increases the reliability of InterBase, and also maintains minimum
communication costs.
5 Conclusion
This paper has addressed the problems inherent in an environment consisting of distributed, het-
erogeneous and autonamous software systems. This environment typically arises in the process of
fulfilling diverse computational and information processingrequirements.
We presented in this paper the components of Interbase (a project implement at Purdue Uni-
versity), and described how a rule-based approach can be used to organize and resolve inconsistency
between different objects in the interbase system. The Interbase Knowledge Base provides for the
correctness of IPL programs and security policies, and may address different concepts of interde-
pendent data.
We have also presented the Interbase Logic Controller (ILC). The ILC is used to control the
different tasks to be pedormed within the Interbase environment. The lnterBase Parrallel Lan-
guage supports a powerful description of advanced transactions and provides communication among
subtransactions with global transactions.
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